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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

l'"NIVERSAL INVESTMENT
)'.
COl\IPANY,
Plaintiff-Respondent_,
Case No.
10165

vs.

CAll-PETS, INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellant.

I

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
The Appellant's state1nent of the kind .of _case is
essentially accurate, except that in addition to the express warranty set forth in the contract documents the
plaintiff further relied upon implied ·warranties as -to
the fiitness for the purpose for which the drapes in
question were intended.
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DISPOSITION BEFORE A TRIAL COURT
The matter was tried to a jury on April15 through
17, 1964, and a verdict was returned by the jury in
favor of the plaintiff in the amount of $3,750.00 to which
the Court added an attorneys fee of $751.83 as had
been agreed to by defendant at the time of pretrial (R.
12}.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and Respondent ask that the verdict and
judgment below be affirmed and that this court order
other and further attorneys fees to plaintiff to cover
this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant's Statement of Facts, so far as it goes,
is essentially correct. As relates to the warranty period
in issue, however, attention is called to the fact that
the guarantee, as originally given, was for a period of
five years (Exhibit 1-letter attached) and the pretrial
order was to the effect that Exhibit 2 did not change
this guarantee period (R. 12-13}. Nevertheless, the
trial court held, and instructed, that the warranty period
was to and including September 16, 1963. The draperies
in question were originally, as the contract required,
white ( Exhibit 1) . They had changed to variegated
darker colors, spotted and streaked with different colors
4
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and shades ( R. 100) and cleaning made no difference
in them (R. 97}. As relates to the draperies in Unit
117, which first became discolored, appellant's statement that the testimony was that iodine or other stain
had been placed on them is erroneous, the testimony, in
fact, simply being that Mr. Thompson, defendant's
agent, had contended that such was the reason for discoloration ( R. 94 and Exhibit 6) . The testimony of
all witnesses at the trial showed that such conjecture
was erroneous, as essentially all of the other drapes
subsequently changed color in the same manner.
The testimony of plaintiff's witnesses was all to
the effect that in the industry a change in color during
a warranty period is considered to be a defect (R. 138,
168}.

ARGUMENT
(A) THE TESTIMONY OF THOMAS
FRANK REGARDING VALUATION AND
DiliAGES 'VAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.
Plaintiff's witness, Ronald Sweitzer, testified with
regard to the fact that the drapes in question became
streaked and spotty and were continuing to change
during the time he was the manager. He stated that
cleaning had no effect on the changed condition of the
drapes (R. 97}. Mr. Sweitzer testified that as of the
latter part of June, 1963 approximately 50% of the
drapes were real bad and the others were changing
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color in the same manner ( R. 99) . Mr. Sweitzer testified that he left the Susan Kay Arms Apartments as
manager on August 1, 1963 (R. 90) and that at that
time 99o/o of the drapes had deteriorated and changed
color (R. 100 and 101), he stating that all except
about one-half dozen single drapes had changed color
(R. 106).
,As a basis and foundation and in connection with
the introduction of Exhibits 8, 9 and 10, which were
the sample curtains, and to show that these samples
were representative of curtains in the apartment at
the time Sweitzer left, when essentially all of them
had changed color, we call attention to Mr. Sweitzer's
testimony as follows (R 106).
"Q. Now, Mr. Sweitzer, you testified that by
the time you left there the curtains in all of the
apartments, with the exception of half a dozen
single ones, had changed color?

A. I did, yes.
Q. What would you say in regard to the situation as to whether or not the samples which you
furnished here are representative generally of
all of the curtains?
A. I would say that the two drapes that are
discolored are representative of all of the rest
of the drapes that are in the apartments."
It will be observed that this was considerably prior
to September 16, 1963, which date the Court instructed
was the end of the warranty period. Furthermore, and
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as confh-mation of such testimony by Mr. Sweitzer,
plaintiff's witness, Thomas J. Denkers, testified that
when he became manager on January 1, 1964 essentially all of the drapes in the Susan Kay Arms were
discolored and badly streaked (R 129) . Accordingly,
there was ample evidence that essentially all of the
drapes had failed within the warranty period.
We submit that the testitnony above set forth specifically identified Exhibits 8, 9 and 10 as being essen·
tially in the same condition as were the drapes generally
in the apartments prior to the end of the warranty
period. Accordingly, a proper foundation was certainly
laid for the testimony of Mr. Frank. Furthermore, it
should be borne in mind (1) that Mr. Frank's testimony
as to value was not tied expressly or exclusively into
Exhibits 8 ,9 and 10, except as to the type of material
therein (R 169), and (2) that he was testifying as an
expert.
Mr. Frank is an interior designer and specifier,
dealing in merchandise of the type involved in this
action and obviously eminently qualified to testify as
an expert with regard to such matters (R 163, 164).
He testified that in the interior decorating industry
and in the industry involving furnishing and sales of
draperies that if the material changes color at any time
·within a warranty period it would be considered a defect (R 168). Frank was a qualified expert witness
and could testify as to values even on the basis of a
hypothetical question, which, in fact, he did (R 1697
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172). His testimony related to the difference in value
of drapes of the type. involved if free from defects as

against their value with the defects which caused them
to change color during the warranty period. As regards
such values and damages, he said that such drapes,
without such defects, were worth approximately $7,200.00, but with defects which caused them to change
color during the warranty period, their value was 15%
to ·20lfo of what it would otherwise ·be, or reduced to
dollars, $1,400.00 to $1,500.00 (R 171-172).
We submit that there was ample and proper basis
and foundation for the testimony of Mr. Frank as to
valuation and otherwise, and that his and the other
evidence amply supported the jury's verdict.

(B) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE WAS PROPERLY DENIED.
In addition to the testimony referred to hereinabove
in connection with sub-heading A of this Argument,
Mr. Gordon Harry, obviously the best qualified man
who testified at the trial as relates to the color changes
and the reasons therefor (R 132-135) testified that a
change of color is in the industry considered a defect
which would come within a warranty against "latent
defects, faulty material," etc. (R 138). . He further
testified that his examination and testing of the materials, confirmed by a laboratory report, showed that
the material had :fluorescent dyes in it and by that alone

8
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it would be considered in the industry as "unservice~
able" (R 14~), he stating there is no way of removing
discoloration from fluorescent dyes (R 188).
Accordingly, there was an abundance of testimony
from the witnesses for the plaintiff to establish, most
conclusively,
(1) That the warranty as against latent defects
and faulty material, etc., did include a warranty that
the color would not change;
(2) That the drapes were in fact defective, and

such defects appeared during the warranty period;
( 3) 'That the defect was one which could not be
cured; and

( 4) The extent of plaintiff's damages.

(C) THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR. A DIRECTED
VERDICT MADE AT THE CLOSE OF THE
TRIAL.
Essentailly, the only basis for Appellant's contion that a motion for a directed verdict should have
been granted, absent the granting of a motion to dismiss at the end of plaintiff's evidence, is based upon
testimony of Mr. Claude Thompson, Mr. Hughes and
~Ir. Holt, who were witnesses called by the defendant.
The most that could be said. with regard to any of such
testimony was that it contradicted testimony of "the
plaintiff-'s witnesses so that the jury was required to

9
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weigh the testimony of the various witnesses and determine which witnesses they would believe and the
weight which they would give to the testimony of the
various witnesses based upon their app,arent experience, qualifications, candor and demeanor on the witness stand. Such being the case, there ·being substantial
evidence to support the plaintiff's contention as set
forth in Arguments A and B above, the jury was entitled to consider the evidence, and having done so to
return a verdict thereon.
(D) THERE WAS NO ERROR IN THE
COURT'S STRIKING THE FINAL PARAGRAPH OF INSTRUCTION NO. 5 TO THE
JURY, AND IN ANY EVENT THE DEFENDANT CANNOT ASSERT ANY ERROR BECAUSE HE FAILED TO OBJECT TO SUCH
INSTRUCTION GIVEN OR OMITTED BY
THE COURT.
Counsel for the Appellant and Defendant was,
of course, in the courtroom during all the time the Court
was reading the instructions to the jury. Defendant's
counsel took no objections or exceptions to Instruction
No. 5 nor to any instructions whatsoever, either as to
those given or those omitted by the Court (R 270).
Such being the case, defendant may not now assign as
error the Court's instruction as actually given. See
Rule 51, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See, also,
McCall vs. Kendrick, 2 Utah 2d 364, 274 P. 2d 962.
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In any event, we submit that the instruction as
given by the Court did in fact properly state the law.

(E) THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE COURT IN REFUSING TO
RECALL THE JURY IN CONNECTION
\VITI-I ALLEGED ERRORS OF COUNSEL
FOR PLAINTIFF IN HIS ARGUMENT.
There is, of course, nothing in the record with
regard to the argument of counsel and plaintiff em-·
phatically denies there was anything improper therein.
Defendant did not, during or at the time of the argument, make any objection thereto and it was only after
the jury had been out for some time that he complained with regard to it. The only thing in the record
which would indicate what the defendant complained
of was his reference to the fact that plaintiff's counsel
in his closing argwnent called attention to language
in Exhibit 2. (R 270). This was an exhibit admitted
in evidence by the Court in its entirety and without
reservations or without objection by the defendant
(R 70).
If in fact there was anything at all bordering upon
an improper argument, which we. emphatically deny,
the defendant waived any right to except thereto by
failing to take such exception at the time the statements were made and during the argument rather than
to wait until the jury had been out for some time before
calling the matter to the attention of the Court. john-
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son vs. Union Pacific, 35 Utah 285, 100 P. 390. We
submit there was no prejudicial error in connection
with this matter.
(F) THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN REFUSING TO GRANT JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT.
The argument as relates to the other points involved fully cover this assignment and we submit that
no error was committed.

(G) THE COURT COMMITTED NO ERROR
IN REFUSING TO GRANT DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.
The whole basis for plaintiff's argument that a
new trial should be granted is that subsequent to the
trial, through an examination of the fabrics involved,
appellant and defendant found a thread which they
feel would have thrown some additional light on the
matter if it had been previously discovered and called
to the attention of the jury. We call the attention of
the Court to the fact that the Exhibits 8, 9 and 10 (in
connection with which this thread is supposed to have
been found) were tendered to and available to the
defendant and appellant for examination, for testing,
or whatever else they desired to do, at least from the
date of the pretrial, which was on February 24, 1964
(R 258). The trial of the case was not held until April
15, 1964. Appellant cannot surely claim any surprise
in the nature of newly discovered evidence, which appel-
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lant could not with reasonable diligence have discovered

had it chosen to take these exhibits and drapes and
examine the1n when they were available to defendant
prior to the tin1e ofthe trial, and in fact during the
progress of the trial. Defendant chose simply to ignore
these draperies. Defendant cannot surely be heard to
say that since it did not diligently prepare for the trial
and since it was unsuccessful in the trial below by
reason of lack of such diligence, it ought now have
another opportunity to present the evidence which it
should have developed and presented at that trial. This
in a nutshell is the contention of the defendant in urging that a new trial should be granted on the ground
of this so-called newly discovered evidence.
Furthermore, the only thing which appellant suggests is that had the matter been discovered at or prior
to the trial it would have been something which would
have made some other or further conflict in the evidence. It would, in other words, have been merely
cumulative of defendant's other testimony. There is
nothing in fact to show that such evidence could reasonably be expected to have changed the results of this
trial or the opinion and conclusions of the jury.
Furthermore, the uniform rule of law seems to be
that in connection with a motion for a new trial the
question as to whether the newly discovered evidence
if presented at the retrial of the case would probably produce a different result is a question addressed
to the sole discretion of the trial judge, whose action

13

y the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Lib
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

will not be disturbed in the absence ,of- a .manifest :showing of abuse of .discretion. .Dankent vs. Lamb FiMnce
Company, 304 P. 2d 199. The rule was recently reenunciated in Utah in Uptown Appliance & Radio
Company .v-s. -Flint., 249 P. 2d 826, wllerein the Court
stated:
"It is axiomatic in this State that the decision
of the triaJ judge in reference to the granting
or refusing of motions for new trials is a discretionary matter, provided there is not an abuse
of discretion and there is reason to "believe that
a miscarriage of justice would result if -refused:"
(H) THE .C.OURT SHOULD ORDER AND
DIRECT ADDITIONAL REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES, COVERING THIS APPEAL; BE ADDED TO THE JUDGMENT BELOW.
The written agreement between the parties .hereto,
which agreement was the one containing the warranties
sued upon, provided for payment of .attorney.s fees by
a defaulting party in the enforcement of -such agreement (Exhibits 1 and 2). The Court below directed
the inclusion in the judgment of attorneys f_ees in the
amount of $751.83 in accordance with defendant's
agreement at the pretrial (R 12). Obviously, such attorneys fees did not include, nor contemplate, attorneys
fees reasonably expended by plaintiff and chargeable
against the -defendant in connection with an appeal to
this Court and such ought be awarded and added to
the judgment below.
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In Hahn vs. Hahn (Cal.) 226 P. 2d 519, a suit
was brought on a promissory note. The lower court
awarded $836.00 as attorneys fees. Plaintiff contended
he was entitled to additional attorneys fees in connection with an appeal taken frotn the judgment below.
The Appellate Court found $300.00 to be a reasonable
fee and said: "The purpose of a provision for attorneys
fees is to indemnify the creditor against the necessity
of paying an attorneys fee, and to enable him to recover
the full amount of his debt without deduction for legal·
expenses".
Again in Cirimele vs. Shinazy (Cal.) 285 P. 2d
311, the Court, in awarding additional attorneys fees
for services in the appellate court, stated: "Under the
rule of Kirk vs. Culley~ 261 P. 994, we may find the
reasonable value of such attorneys fees without remanding the cause to the trial court."
·
Again in Dankert vs. Lamb Finance

Company~

304 P. 2d, 199 (Cal.), the Court stated: "A contract

for a reasonable attorneys fee in enforcing its provisions embraces an allowance for legal services rendered
upon appeal as well as during the trial".
We submit that this Court has the jurisdiction and
power, in its discretion, to appraise the legal services
shown by the record to have been rendered in connection with this appeal and having adjudicated the value
of such services to direct the addition of the fair value
thereof to the judgment entered in the court below.
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See in addition to the above cited cases, Kirk vs. Culley,
261 P. 994 (Cal. 1927).

CONCLUSION
Respondent respectfully suggests that no basis
w~atsoever has been shown for appellant's contention
that the Court below committed error and respondent
respectfully urges that the judgment below be affirmed,
with the request, however, that this Court determine
and assess further and additional attorneys fees to be
added to said judgment to compensate the plaintiff
in connection with this appeal.
Respectfully submitted,
ZARE. HAYES
PUGSLEY, HAYES, RAMPTON
&WATKISS
600 El Paso Natural Gas Bldg.

Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Respondent
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